Gitbook Breached
163 points by punchmesan 2 days ago | 41 comments
We opened a ticket with support about Gitbook availability issues and got this in reply. We have yet to see any official customer communication or breach notification. Apologies for the formatting, did the best I could as it's a mobile paste.

Update:

GitBook security incident update Hey <$name>, The GitBook app, the GitBook API, and published docs are available again. A few services may still be degraded as we finish restoring everything to full performance.

*What happened* GitBook has been the target of a sophisticated, highly targeted attack using AI agents. At 19:00 CET, November 2, the attacker gained unauthorized access to some of our infrastructure credentials. We detected the attack immediately and acted swiftly to block further impact. To make sure our infrastructure was fully secure, we then took the GitBook app and authenticated docs sites offline. We kept publicly published content live for as long as possible, using cached data.

*What we did immediately* * Blocked the attacker and closed the vulnerabilities involved * Replaced every credential and secret across our infrastructure * Brought services back only once we were confident they were secure * Invalidated every customer’s API tokens on our platform

*Your data* Our investigation shows that the attacker may have accessed the following: * Git Sync secrets. * GitBook API tokens. * Third-party API tokens used to connect external tools to GitBook. * Questions asked to GitBook Assistant by your site visitors.

At this stage, we have found no evidence that any of your content in GitBook was modified.

*What you need to do now* * Rotate any existing GitBook API tokens. We revoked all personal API tokens during the incident. * Rotate any third-party API tokens or secrets you use to connect other tools to GitBook. * If you have published integrations that use secrets, rotate those secrets. * If you use the GitBook MCP server, re-authenticate it. Please contact your GitBook organization’s admin to assist with this process.

*What we are doing next* * Monitoring the situation in case of further attacks. * Introducing further security measures to our platform. * Writing a full post mortem that will be published soon with more detailed information about the incident. * If you have any further questions, please reach out to your account manager or our support team. You can also check status.gitbook.com for updates

Thank you for your patience, and we apologize again for the disruption The GitBook team

  • punchmesan 2 days ago |
    Oof that formatting is rougher than I thought. Will try to clean it up after I'm done reconfiguring gitbook...
    • verdverm 2 days ago |
      new lines between bullets, only italics available, not markdown
  • philipwhiuk 2 days ago |
    This is the public disclosure: https://www.gitbookstatus.com/incidents/01M6FXDDGQRWHMYYWXY2...

    Note that the summary at the top of https://www.gitbookstatus.com at time of writing does not mention the unauthorized access and the incident details does not mention the contents disclosed above.

  • petecooper 2 days ago |
    • philipwhiuk 2 days ago |
      It's bizarre they have both this and gitbookstatus.com and they contain different info.
    • eddythompson80 2 days ago |
      Does a security incident page really need to connect to 11 3rd party domains. smh
  • manytimesaway 2 days ago |
    FYI, Gitbook was made by the team behing friendco.de, which they killed without any announcement years ago.
    • SamyPesse 2 days ago |
      I’m genuinely sorry the end of friendco.de impacted you. It was 12-13 years ago; the service had little usage at the time, and we probably didn’t handle the end perfectly. I don’t recall exactly, but I can assure you that the team today is more experienced.
      • manytimesaway 2 days ago |
        To be fair, I don't recall exactly the end of it either (I did not think it was that long ago!), but I remember being severely disappointed by the sudden disappearance of it (AFAIK I was trying to set it up inside a community project), and as such not trusting GitBook afterwards.

        Thanks for the honest answer, nonetheless. Good luck with the incident.

    • viccis 2 days ago |
      Not really relevant here.
  • aliasxneo 2 days ago |
    "GitBook has been the target of a sophisticated, highly targeted attack using AI agents."

    Add it to the list, I guess.

    • nsoam 2 days ago |
      Is this what they mean when they talk about accountability laundering?

      Oh, you see, we had the best security ever, but they used AI agents, and there's no defence for that, you can't secure a system against those spooky AI agents.

      • SamyPesse 2 days ago |
        This is not what we meant. We will be accountable and will post a complete post-mortem. But it’s important to understand that the attack was a lot more developed than what we’ve been used to with humans, especially in terms of pace and adaptability.
        • eichin 2 days ago |
          For a lot of places, handling this kind of incident response was "eating your vegetables" preparation that has just in the last couple of months turned into "for me it was Tuesday"...
  • SamyPesse 2 days ago |
    GitBook’s CTO here

    We have been dealing with a security attack since yesterday. Our team has been all hands on deck since the start, and we took a large portion of our services offline to prioritize user security.

    Our service is progressively coming back online (most of it already is), and we are actively monitoring the situation.

    We’ll continue to actively keep our users updated through emails, Slack, and our status page as we monitor the situation and learn more.

    • gkoberger 2 days ago |
      Good luck... this isn't easy, so best of luck to you and the team.
      • gk1 2 days ago |
        Classy response.

        With the spate of attacks on infra providers over the past few weeks, it's been interesting to see how different competitors respond. The confidence some of the founders seem to have that they won't/can't be next is telling.

    • latchkey 2 days ago |
      After turning on 2FA, the page doesn't update to say it is turned on. It still has a configure button. Reloading the page fixes this.
    • xmcp123 2 days ago |
      Nice to see someone not fucking up outreach during a security incident.

      Good work.

      • throwrioawfo 2 days ago |
        Did you read the body of this post?
      • john_strinlai 2 days ago |
        >Nice to see someone not fucking up outreach

        it is sort of funny to see this on a post submitted by a gitbook user that starts off by saying "We have yet to see any official customer communication or breach notification.", and where the company's status page (https://www.gitbookstatus.com/incidents/01M6FXDDGQRWHMYYWXY2...) doesn't mention the customer data that was potentially accessed by the attackers or mention that credentials/tokens should be rotated.

        in fact, that status page (which is linked to at the top of the gitbook site) still says "You don’t need to do anything right now."

    • MrZander 2 days ago |
      > GitBook has been the target of a sophisticated, highly targeted attack using AI agents

      Serious question: How do you know it was using AI agents? What logs distinguish it from a human?

      I see this claim a lot and while I don't doubt AI is being used for this, I have a hard time believing every breach has a smoking gun showing it to be an AI assisted attack.

      • conartist6 2 days ago |
        Maybe there was a level-of-stupidity tip-off, like trying to break in and access something that's already public...
      • ipsum2 2 days ago |
        My guess is the speed of exfiltration/exploration of the environment is probably impossible for a human, or even a small team. But I'm also curious what their evidence is.
      • michaelscott 6 hours ago |
        Generally the speed of breaking through components of the tech stack. They chain exploits and they move through the system at a rate that's far faster than even a team of humans could pull off
    • michaelscott 6 hours ago |
      Experienced this with a client as well, all my thoughts to you guys and the team. One thing we struggled with was determining the effective blast radius of compromised credentials. Blocking access was one thing, but the other critical component was whether activity could be reconstructed from independent logs (for this event and in future). Intereseted in whether the postmortem covers how you guys have established those boundaries, would make for some good learnings in general.

      Feels like a new normal

  • latchkey 2 days ago |
    One thing that would be appreciated are more details in these sorts of reports.

    "the attacker gained unauthorized access to some of our infrastructure credentials"

    How? Which infrastructure?

    • SamyPesse 2 days ago |
      We’ll provide details in a long post-mortem. For now, it was important to notify our users as early as possible.
  • altbdoor 2 days ago |
    Mentioned this 5h ago, but this post definitely fleshes out more details.

    https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50351061

  • FastDeep 2 days ago |
    Good that they rotated all the tokens themselves instead of just telling users to do it, seen too many incidents where that step gets skipped.
  • tom1337 2 days ago |
    What's happening currently that every other a day a major service is breached? Is it really just all AI Agents being blasted on those targets?
  • Panino 2 days ago |
    I think the timing is perfect for someone to create a simple, clean, breach link aggregator site.
    • ahoog42 2 days ago |
      I built this incident tracker a few years ago [1] but currently focus on SEC, State AG, and HHS posted incidents. There's a lot of noise if you go with news, blog, and company posts but I process them occasionally.

      [1] https://www.board-cybersecurity.com/incidents/tracker

  • FearNotDaniel a day ago |
    > sophisticated, highly targeted attack

    I love the way all incident reports tell you the attack was sophisticated and highly targeted, as if those words actually mean anything. Nobody wants to admit they were DDOSed by a script kiddie just randomly trying exploits. The subtext is: well, we expected hackers; just not really good ones.

  • SamyPesse a day ago |
    A quick update to this thread that the incident is resolved, and we'll be publishing a post-mortem in the next 24 hours covering what happened, the impact it had, what we did to resolve, and what'll we do next. You can get an update when this is out on GitBook status page.